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FARMER COOPERATIVES “TAKE COVER”:
THE CAPPER-VOLSTEAD EXEMPTION IS
UNDER SIEGE
Donald M. Barnes* & Jay L. Levine**
“When tillage begins, other arts follow. The farmers, therefore,
are the founders of human civilization.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
There can be little dispute that food production is of vital
interest to any nation’s security and economy. For this reason,
the United States Congress, like many other legislatures around
the world, has accorded special treatment to the agricultural
industry, and particularly to farmers. One example of this special
treatment is the Capper-Volstead Act, which provides farmers
with immunity from antitrust liability for joint conduct
undertaken by and through an “association” of producers.2

*

Donald M. Barnes is a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Porter Wright Morris
& Arthur and is the Co-Chair of the Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law Practice Group.
Mr. Barnes is currently Chair of the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives’ Antitrust
Subcommittee. He is a 1970 cum laude graduate of the George Washington University
School of Law where he served as Notes Editor of the Law Review and is a member of the
order of the Coif. His practice is concentrated in antitrust/trade regulation law, agricultural
cooperative law, and complex antitrust and commercial litigation.
**
Jay L. Levine is a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Porter Wright Morris &
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protection, with a particular emphasis on the agriculture and food industries, and general
complex litigation.
1. DANIEL WEBSTER, REMARKS ON AGRICULTURE, Jan. 13, 1840.
2. 7 U.S.C. § 291. Introduced by Senator Arthur Capper (R) Kansas and
Representative Andrew Volstead (R) Minnesota. William Richard Tillman, The Legislative
History of the Capper-Volstead Act 42 (1930) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of
Kansas) (on file with the University of Kansas). An “agricultural cooperative” is simply an
association of agricultural producers—”farmers”—and thus the term is used interchangeably
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As the country transformed itself from an agrarian economy
to a more industrialized and urban economy, an imbalance in
bargaining power grew between farmers, on the one hand, and
their customers—processors or distributors (e.g., large
supermarkets)—on the other.3 Farmers were at risk of going
bankrupt or being forced to sell their land.4 This untenable
situation imperiled the nation’s food supply and risked raising
consumer prices for food staples to unacceptable levels.5 Enacted
in 1922, the Capper-Volstead Act was intended to correct this
power imbalance by allowing farmers to associate with each other
and collectively market their products.6 Indeed, because some of
the more essential functions of agricultural cooperatives implicate
the antitrust laws, the Capper-Volstead Act has been key to
allowing farmers to achieve their objectives, and has even been
referred to as the “Magna Carta” of agricultural cooperatives.7
Notwithstanding the historical centrality of the CapperVolstead Act to the efficient functioning of agricultural
cooperatives, the protections afforded by the Act have been under
increasing attack in private antitrust litigation. In recent years,
class actions have been filed against mushroom, potato, egg, and
dairy farmers, and their cooperatives.8 In addition, many
middlemen, including large supermarkets and other power
buyers, have opted out of these classes and chosen to bring their
own actions. These “opt out” plaintiffs include some of the
with “farmer cooperative.”
Agricultural Cooperative, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY,
[https://perma.cc/HD49-4UEZ] (last visited Jan. 20, 2021).
3. Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 825-26 (1978); Nat’l
Broiler Mktg. Ass’n, 436 U.S. at 830 (Brennan, J., concurring).
4. Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n, 436 U.S. at 830 (Brennan, J., concurring).
5. See DONALD A. FREDERICK, ANTITRUST STATUS OF FARMER COOPERATIVES: THE
STORY OF THE CAPPER-VOLSTEAD ACT 63, 66 (2002).
6. See Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n, 436 U.S. at 824-26.
7. EWELL PAUL ROY, COOPERATIVES: TODAY AND TOMORROW 215-216 (2d ed.
1969).
8. See generally In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 621 F. Supp. 2d
274 (E.D. Pa. 2009); In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 867 (E.D.
Pa. 2012); In re Fresh & Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Idaho
2011) (recently settled); Edwards v. Nat’l Milk Producers Fed’n, No. C 11-04766 JSW, 2014
WL 4643639 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2014) (recently settled). In the interest of full disclosure,
Mr. Barnes is counsel of record in In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig, and both
Mr. Barnes and Mr. Levine are lead counsel for one of the largest defendants in In re
Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig.
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largest supermarket chains in the world—the very type of “power
buyer” middlemen whose disproportionate bargaining leverage
motivated Congress to enhance and protect the collective
bargaining power of farmers by passage of the Capper-Volstead
Act.9 Each of these antitrust cases involve conduct that, arguably,
is immune under the Capper-Volstead Act.10 Yet, the plaintiffs
in these actions challenge the application of the Capper-Volstead
Act and raise issues that go to the heart of the antitrust exemption,
potentially exposing thousands of agricultural cooperatives and
their members to crippling damages awards.
While the Capper-Volstead Act is often referred to as
arcane,11 the number of antitrust suits filed in the past ten to
fifteen years against farmers and their cooperatives have
engendered more scrutiny of this legislation than at any other time
in the past. This Article endeavors to explain the current issues
facing the Capper-Volstead Act and the potential consequences
of judicial decisions that rob it of its effectiveness. We begin with
a description of the key cooperative antitrust exemption statutes
and their origins, and then proceed to address the pending legal
challenges and the threats they pose to the exemption and to
cooperatives and farmers themselves.12 We also consider
whether these decisions may have consequences beyond the
United States’ borders.13

9. Bridget Goldschmidt, Grocers’ Claims Rejected in Egg Antitrust Case (Dec. 13,
2019), [https://perma.cc/R5CS-RML7]; A.S. Klein, Annotation, Monopolies: construction
of § 1 of the Capper-Volstead Act (7 U.S.C.A § 291) authorizing persons engaged in the
production of agricultural products to act together in associations, 20 A.L.R. Fed. 924
(1974).
10. See In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 621 F. Supp. 2d at 278-79;
In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d at 877; In re Fresh & Process
Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d at 1148-49; Edwards, 2014 WL 4643639, at *1.
11. Transcript of Oral Argument at 268, In re Processed Eggs Prod. Antitrust Litig.,
No. 08-md-2002 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
12. See infra Parts II-IV.
13. See infra Part V.
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAPPER-VOLSTEAD
ACT
A. The Years Leading Up to 1922
One hundred years after Samuel Slater opened the first
industrial mill in the United States, which was widely credited as
the beginning of the American industrial revolution, Congress
passed the Sherman Act in 1890.14 At the time, there was intense
public opposition to the concentration of economic power in large
corporations.15 Farmers in particular complained because of the
high prices they were charged for transporting their products to
the cities by railroad.16 Large industrial trusts were seen as
stifling competition and causing prices to increase even higher.17
Thus, Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to engage
in concerted conduct “in restraint of trade.”18
Partly as a response to the industrial revolution, which
caused many farmers to leave their land in search of work in the
cities, the concept of agricultural cooperatives took hold in
Europe in the late 1700s.19 Cooperatives allowed small,
independent farmers to pool their resources and become more
efficient.20 By the 1800s, the concept of a cooperative took hold
in the United States and became prominent in the agricultural
sector.21 The American Farm Bureau and the National Farmers
Union emerged as strong promoters of agricultural cooperatives
in the early 1900s by providing technical assistance to new
cooperatives, and by lobbying for the enactment of state and

14. Deborah A. Ballam, The Evolution of the Government-Business Relationship in the
United States: Colonial Times to Present, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 553, 580 n.109, 612 (1994).
15. FREDERICK, supra note 5, at 22.
16. Id. at 9.
17. 21 CONG. REC. 2461 (Mar. 21, 1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal.”).
19. See History of Co-ops, CO+OP, WELCOME TO THE TABLE, [https://perma.cc/ZE2LCDS5](last visited Jan. 22, 2021).
20. See id.
21. FREDRICK., supra note 5, at 9-10, 19-21.
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federal legislation favorable to cooperatives.22
And as
cooperatives continued to grow, they were being sued for
violations of the Sherman Act, the very statute that many of them
hoped would bring them relief from the railroad trusts.23 For
example, dairy farmer associations grew quickly in the early
1900s as they assisted their members by setting a minimum price
for their members’ products. But, they faced several antitrust
actions, which discouraged future membership.24
The reach of the Sherman Act was quite broad and
prohibited conduct that Congress did not wish to condemn. Thus,
in 1914, Congress enacted the Clayton Act.25 Of relevance here,
Section 6 of the Clayton Act provides:
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to
forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or
horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of
mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for
profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such
organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate
objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the
members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the
antitrust laws.26

Section 6 of the Clayton Act recognized the unique problems
facing farmers and cooperatives, along with their counterparts in
the workforce, namely workers and their labor unions.27 Each
group faced an enormous imbalance in bargaining power when
facing grocery retailers and employers, respectively, but each
were prohibited by the Sherman Act from joining together to gain
any leverage. Section 6 sought to correct that situation by treating
all members of the association as being part of a single
organization and therefore incapable of conspiring under Section

22. See History, American Farm Bureau Federation, [https://perma.cc/W393TBP2](last visited Jan. 22, 2021); History, National Farmers Union,
[https://perma.cc/3DY3-DS8G](last visited Jan. 22, 2021).
23. See FREDERICK, supra note 5, at 62, 69-70, 74.
24. Id. at 61-62.
25. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (emphasis added).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 17.
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1 of the Sherman Act, thus becoming the original legislative
foundation for the agricultural cooperative antitrust exemption.28
But the language of Section 6 posed another problem. By its
terms, it only applied to cooperatives that did not issue capital
stock.29 Indeed, raisin grape growers, under threat of prosecution
from the Department of Justice, entered into a consent decree just
a month before the Capper-Volstead Act was passed.30
Previously, the Federal Trade Commission had reported that
Section 6 of the Clayton Act did not apply to the current structure
of the raisin growers’ association because it had capital stock.31
B. The Passage of the Capper-Volstead Act
The fact that the antitrust protections contained in Section 6
were limited to non-stock cooperatives proved to be a real
problem. Congress believed that extending protection to
cooperatives that issued stock would increase farmers’ incentive
to unite and enhance their economic strength.32 An extension of
the protection was necessary because farmers were continuing to
be at a severe disadvantage in the marketplace. Not only were
they subject to the whims of Mother Nature, but they were also at
the mercy of processors and distributors who could dictate terms
of sale.33 This was especially disadvantageous for the farmers
dealing in perishable commodities.34
Thus, the Capper-Volstead Act was enacted in 1922 to
clarify and expand the exemption in Section 6 of the Clayton Act
and to include cooperatives with capital stock:
Persons engaged in the production of agricultural products
as farmers, planters, ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit
growers may act together in associations, corporate or
otherwise, with or without capital stock, in collectively
processing, preparing for market, handling, and marketing in
28. Note, Trust Busting down on the Farm: Narrowing the Scope of Antitrust
Exemptions for Agricultural Cooperatives, 61 VA. L. REV. 341, 352-56 (1975).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 17.
30. FREDERICK, supra note 5 at 62-63, 66.
31. See id. at 65-66.
32. Id. at 94-100, 102-03.
33. See id. at 91.
34. 62 CONG. REC. 2123 (1922) (statement of Sen. Walsh).
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interstate and foreign commerce, such products of persons
so engaged. Such associations may have marketing agencies
in common; and such associations and their members may
make the necessary contracts and agreements to effect such
purposes . . . .35

The expanded exemption spelled out certain structural
requirements that a farmer cooperative had to meet before it was
entitled to antitrust immunity. Specifically, it required that the
association must be “operated for the mutual benefit of the
members . . . as . . . producers . . . .”36 Second, each member may
have only one vote, or the cooperative must limit dividends on
capital stock to eight percent per annum.37 Third, the cooperative
cannot deal in non-member products in an amount greater in value
than the products of members.38
The Act expressly exempted the “collective[] processing,
preparing for market, handling, and marketing” of agricultural
products.39 Judicial decisions have interpreted the CapperVolstead Act to include the ability to fix prices,40 form federations
of cooperatives,41 vertically integrate,42 achieve monopolies,43
and include foreign members in domestic cooperatives.44

35. 7 U.S.C. § 291. Interestingly, the Act references associations not cooperatives.
Indeed, no formal corporate structure is mandated by the Act. Nevertheless, the two have
become synonymous because agricultural associations that wish to avail themselves of
Capper-Volstead Act protections have typically organized themselves into cooperatives.
36. 7 U.S.C. § 291. Throughout this article, the term “farmer,” “producer,” and
“grower,” are used interchangeably and are intended to identify those persons or entities that
qualify for the protections of the Capper-Volstead Act.
37. 7 U.S.C. § 291.
38. 7 U.S.C. § 291.
39. 7 U.S.C. § 291.
40. Treasure Valley Potato Bargaining Ass’n v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 497 F.2d 203, 214
(9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 999 (1974).
41. United States v. Dairymen, Inc., 660 F.2d 192, 194 (6th Cir. 1981).
42. N. Cal. Supermarkets, Inc. v. Cent. Cal. Lettuce Producers Coop., 413 F. Supp.
984, 985-86 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aff’d, 580 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1090 (1979); Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S. 19, 2729 (1962).
43. Cape Cod Food Prods., Inc. v. Nat’l Cranberry Ass’n, 119 F. Supp. 900, 907 (D.
Mass. 1954); GVF Cannery, Inc. v. Cal. Tomato Growers Ass’n, 511 F. Supp. 711, 716 (N.D.
Cal. 1981).
44. Northland Cranberries, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 2d 221,
224-26 (D. Mass. 2004); In re Fresh & Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d
1141, 1157-58 (D. Idaho 2011).
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But courts have held that the Act does not immunize all
cooperative behavior. The immunity does not apply to situations
where the cooperative: (a) conspires with a non-cooperative or
non-producer entity;45 (b) enrolls non-farmers as members;46 (c)
engages in predatory conduct;47 or (d) monopolizes to such an
extent that prices are unduly enhanced.48 Additionally, Section 2
of the Capper-Volstead Act authorizes the Secretary of
Agriculture to obtain a cease and desist order if he finds that an
association has monopolized or restrained trade to such an extent
that the price of any agricultural product is unduly enhanced.49
III. THE EXEMPTION UNDER ATTACK
One of the principal challenges in advising farmers and their
cooperatives, and in litigating the applicability of the CapperVolstead exemption, is the paucity of case law interpreting the
statute. Since its enactment in 1922, there have been less than
250 cases that involve the Capper-Volstead Act, while there have
been tens of thousands of cases dealing with the Sherman Act, a
statute that is only thirty-two years older.50
This dearth of case law has provided plaintiffs with plenty of
opportunities to chip away at the exemption.51 This is especially
true given the evolution and complexity of modern agricultural
cooperatives.
Some of the more recent challenges to the Capper-Volstead
Act include the following:
The inadvertent inclusion of a non-farmer in the cooperative.
Under certain circumstances, a cooperative can lose its antitrust

45. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 204-05 (1939).
46. Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 822-24, 826-29 (1978).
47. Md. & Va. Milk Producers Ass’n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 463, 465-67
(1960).
48. Id. at 462; see also 7 U.S.C. § 292.
49. Md. & Va. Milk Producers Ass’n, 362 U.S. at 462; 7 U.S.C. § 292.
50. At the time of publication, there were only 222 cases dealing with the CapperVolstead Act (7 U.S.C. § 291) and 19,321 dealing with the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1).
51. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has also publicly stated that
the Capper-Volstead Act should be narrowly construed and applied in only limited
circumstances. See, e.g., Statement of Int. on Behalf of the U.S. at 13, Sitts v. Dairy Farmers
of Am., Inc., Case No. 2:16-cv-00287-cr (D. Vt. July 27, 2020).
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immunity if its membership includes non-farmers.52 But many
farming operations are family-owned and utilize different
corporate entities for various aspects of the business, such as one
entity devoted to the farming operation while another is devoted
to processing the product. What happens if the owners of the
various agricultural businesses inadvertently had one of their nonfarming entities (e.g., a distribution company) sign the
cooperative membership application, even though it is clear that
their farming entities were really the intended members? Will
that destroy the immunity?53
If the cooperative does not qualify for Capper-Volstead
protection because it inadvertently (or negligently) includes a
non-producer among its membership, or loses the exemption
because of an after-the-fact determination by the judiciary on an
issue of first impression, are the farmer-members subject to
antitrust liability, even though they relied in good faith on the
cooperative’s representation that it qualified for Capper-Volstead
immunity?54
Given the broad statutory language protecting cooperatives’
ability to collectively handle, prepare for market, and market
members’ commodities, are cooperative efforts to manage supply
(both pre-planting and post-harvest) protected by CapperVolstead? In other words, while it is clear that farmer-members
can fix prices for their products sold through the cooperative, can
the cooperative and its members collectively decide on preproduction (pre-planting for crops or culling practices for
livestock) strategies to manage and reduce supply?55 What about
collectively managing post-production supply?56
While cooperative members must be farmers, does the Act’s
protection extend to cooperatives and cooperative members with
value added (vertically integrated) operations?57 In other words,
if a tomato farmer is part of a tomato grower’s cooperative but the
farmer also has a processing plant that produces tomato juice from
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 828-29 (1978).
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.C.
See infra Part III.C.
See infra Part III.D.
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its harvested tomatoes, does the fact that the farmer also has these
processing capabilities destroy its status as a “farmer,” thus
robbing the cooperative, and all the other members, of the Act’s
protections?58 The same question applies to vertically integrated
cooperatives as well.
Finally, when does an entity qualify as a farmer?59
Understandably, if a company simply distributes or processes
agricultural products and engages in none of the traditional
farming operations, the entity would not have a valid claim to
farmer status. But, what if it owned the land and simply leased it
out to another entity that raised the crops or livestock?60
Conversely, is a sharecropper a farmer?61 What if the entity did
not have title to the livestock or the land, but engaged in all of the
husbandry practices?62
A. Inadvertent Inclusion of a Non-Farmer: Will an Honest
Mistake Destroy the Exemption?
The district court in In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser
Antitrust Litigation said yes.63 In that case, plaintiffs alleged that
a cooperative and its members conspired to fix and raise the price
of mushrooms while also engaging in activities that reduced the
number of mushrooms produced nationally.64 One of the
“members” of the mushroom cooperative was a produce
distributor, which was owned by several family members.65
These same family members also owned a mushroom farm and
another related company.66 The two non-farm companies neither
farmed the land nor grew the mushrooms.67 The family intended
to enroll the mushroom growing company as the member, but by
mistake, the cooperative membership agreement was signed by
58. See infra Part III.D.
59. See infra Part III.E.
60. See infra Part III.E.
61. See infra Part III.E.
62. See infra Part III.E.
63. In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 621 F. Supp. 2d 274, 278-79,
286 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
64. Id. at 279.
65. Id. at 278.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 278-79.
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one of the non-grower companies.68 In a 2009 decision, the
district court denied the cooperative’s motion for summary
judgment, and granted the plaintiffs’ cross motion for summary
judgment, on the issue of Capper-Volstead immunity.69 The court
rejected defendants’ argument that the mistaken designation of
the non-farmer member was a “de minimis exception” and held
that “the existence of even one non-farmer member in an
agricultural cooperative is sufficient to destroy Capper-Volstead
immunity.”70 On appeal, the Third Circuit declined to reach the
merits.71
The courts in In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust
Litigation and In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litigation,
accepted that a non-farmer’s membership in a cooperative will
destroy the Capper-Volstead exemption.72 That viewpoint is
based on a strict reading of the Supreme Court’s decision in
National Broiler Marketing Association v. United States, where
the Court denied immunity to a cooperative in which a very small
number of its approximately seventy-five members were not
traditional farmers or producers.73
The court stated: “a
cooperative organization that includes [non-farmers]—or even
one of them—as members is not entitled to the limited protection
of the Capper-Volstead Act.”74
But subsequent courts did not take such a black and white
approach to the issue and limited National Broiler Marketing
Association to its particular facts. In fact, just four years after
National Broiler Marketing Association was decided, the Eighth
Circuit employed a more nuanced approach.75 In Alexander v.
National Farmers Organization, the cooperative had several nonproducers who paid membership dues that were functionally
equivalent to donations.76 Moreover, these non-producers were
68. In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 621 F. Supp. 2d at 284.
69. Id. at 291.
70. Id. at 285.
71. In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 655 F.3d at 164 n.4.
72. Id. at 286; In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 08-md-2002, 2016 WL
5539592, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2016).
73. Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 820, 822, 827-29 (1978).
74. Id. at 828-29.
75. Alexander v. Nat’l Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1187 (8th Cir. 1982).
76. Id. at 1185-86.
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not on the Board and had no voice in the management of the
cooperative.77 Under these circumstances, the court did not allow
the non-farmer membership to destroy the exemption.78 The
court reasoned that, prior to National Broiler Marketing
Association, “it was not at all clear that careless membership
practices would, standing alone, preclude operation of the
exemption.”79 The court further characterized the non-farmer
members in National Broiler Marketing Association as
“essentially middlemen” and distinguished the non-farmers in the
present case as supporters, reasoning that the “receipt of twentyfive dollars in ‘dues’ from a handful of individuals is hardly the
same as shielding middlemen from price-fixing liability.”80 Thus,
the court ultimately held that the Capper-Volstead exemption
immunized the cooperative’s activities, even though individuals
unrelated to the industry had paid membership dues during the
period.81
Many years later, a district court considered whether the
inclusion of non-producer “associate members”—who had no
control over the cooperative’s operations—would affect
eligibility for Capper-Volstead immunity.82
The court
determined that immunity could still apply.83 As the court held,
“[s]imply put, associate members with no control over an
agricultural cooperative are not true statutory ‘members’ and do
not strip the cooperative of its exempt status.”84
Thus, it is unclear whether the mere membership of a nonfarmer, especially one who has no meaningful involvement in the
management of a cooperative, will destroy the antitrust immunity
a cooperative would otherwise enjoy. And though the court in In
re Mushroom Direct Purchasers Antitrust Litigation held that the
inadvertent designation of the wrong company as a cooperative
member destroyed the exemption, the reasoning and tenor of the
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
1996).
83.
84.

Id. at 1186.
See id. at 1187.
Id. at 1186.
Nat’l Farmers Org., 687 F.2d at 1186.
Id. at 1187.
Agritronics Corp. v. Nat’l Dairy Herd Ass’n, 914 F. Supp. 814, 823-824 (N.D.N.Y.
Id.
Id. at 824.
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two other post-National Broilers Marketing Association decision
cited above casts doubt that other courts would reach the same
conclusion.85 Indeed, in declining to rule on the interlocutory
appeal, the Third Circuit noted “[t]here is no dispute that the
question, whether the arguably inadvertent inclusion of an
ineligible member strips an agricultural cooperative of CapperVolstead protection, is both serious and unsettled.”86 To date, this
is the only appellate court decision to have even mentioned this
specific issue.
B. Will a “Good Faith” Belief in the Exempt Status of a
Cooperative be Enough?
Certain grower-defendants in In re Mushroom Direct
Purchaser Antitrust Litigation later moved the district court to
reconsider its 2009 decision, arguing they should not lose their
Capper-Volstead immunity simply because the cooperative or a
fellow member made a mistake, given that they acted under a
“good faith” belief (based on the advice of their counsel) that their
cooperative was properly constituted.87 The district court rejected
that argument, reasoning that because proof of “specific intent” is
not required in order to establish a violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, good-faith reliance on the advice of counsel
affirming Capper-Volstead status of the cooperative could not
serve to defeat plaintiffs’ Section 1 claims.88
The district court in In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser
Antitrust Litigation also considered the defendants’ argument that
the three family-owned companies, including the non-grower,
might be considered a “single entity” incapable of conspiring
under the Sherman Act.89 But the court rejected that argument as
well, holding that “the single entity defense cannot be used to
circumvent the Capper-Volstead Act’s requirement” that a
85. See In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 655 F.3d 158, 162-63, 167
(3d Cir. 2011); see also Nat’l Farmers Org., 687 F.2d at 1187; Agritronics Corp., 914 F.
Supp. at 823-24.
86. In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 655 F.3d at 164 n.4.
87. In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 54 F. Supp. 3d 382, 391 (E.D.
Pa. 2014).
88. Id. at 391-93.
89. See id. at 386, 388.
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cooperative can only include producer members to qualify for
immunity.90 Although the district court certified its rulings on
both the good faith and single entity issues for interlocutory
appeal, the Third Circuit declined to hear the appeal,91 leaving the
district court’s rulings to stand.
The good-faith issue surfaced again in In re Processed Eggs
In moving for summary
Products Antitrust Litigation.92
judgment, one of the producer-defendants argued that a
cooperative member’s good-faith belief that the cooperative
qualified for Capper-Volstead immunity should be sufficient to
protect the innocent member.93 The defendant argued that
denying it the protections of the Act, despite the producer’s goodfaith belief that the cooperative qualified, would frustrate the
entire intent of the Act and would subject producers to enormous
liability because of the cooperative’s failure to police its
membership rolls.94
Moreover, the exemptions for both agriculture and labor
stem from Section 6 of the Clayton Act and are akin to fraternal
twins.95 Because union members enjoy protection from the
antitrust laws based on a good-faith belief that the labor
exemption from the antitrust laws applied to their union,96 the
defendant argued that agricultural producers should be afforded
the same right.97 It further argued that the focus of the good-faith
inquiry should be on whether the farmer-member had a good faith
90. Id. at 390-91.
91. In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 14-8135 (3d Cir. Dec. 2,
2014).
92. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Rose Acre Farms, Inc.’s Motion for
Summary Judgment at 23-24, In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 08-md-2002
(E.D. Pa. July 2, 2015), ECF No. 1238 [hereinafter Memorandum in Support of Rose Acre].
93. Id. at 23-25. See also Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Rose Acre Farms,
Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 49-50, In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig.,
No. 08-md-2002 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 2015), ECF No. 1304 [hereinafter Reply Memorandum in
Support of Rose Acre].
94. Memorandum in Support of Rose Acre, supra note 92, at 28-29.
95. 15 U.S.C. § 17; see also Memorandum in Support of Rose Acre, supra note 92, at
26.
96. See Consol. Express, Inc. v. N.Y. Shipping Ass’n, 602 F.2d 494, 520-21 (3d Cir.
1979). See also Feather v. United Mine Workers of America, 711 F.2d 530, 542 (3d Cir.
1983); In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1160-61 (3d Cir.
1993).
97. Memorandum in Support of Rose Acre, supra note 92, at 26.
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belief that its conduct was protected by the Capper-Volstead Act,
not on whether it believed its conduct was proscribed by the
Sherman Act.98
In denying summary judgment, the court noted that nothing
in the Capper-Volstead Act itself suggested that Congress
intended to provide antitrust immunity based on a farmer’s good
faith belief that the cooperative qualified for the Capper-Volstead
protections.99 Interestingly, the court sympathized with the fact
that a cooperative member could be exposed to crippling treble
damages through no fault of its own.100 The court referred to the
lack of a statutory good-faith defense as a gaping hole in the law.
Nevertheless, it stated that, until Congress plugs the hole,
“diligent policing by co-operative members of the membership
rules is the only available protection.”101 Given that some
agricultural cooperatives include over 10,000 members, that is
indeed an arduous task for the cooperative’s administration.102
And, as in In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust
Litigation, the district court in In re Processed Egg Products
Antitrust Litigation held that whether cooperative members
believed in good faith that the cooperative was properly
constituted was irrelevant and denied the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on that basis.103 In agreement with the district
court in In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation
that the absence of a specific-intent requirement in the Sherman
Act negates the existence of a good-faith defense, the district
court in In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litigation
described the defendants’ argument, that the focus should instead
be on the Capper-Volstead Act, as a “distinction without a

98. Reply Memorandum in Support of Rose Acre, supra note 93, at 52-53.
99. See In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 08-md-2002, 2016 WL
5539592, at *12-13 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2016).
100. See id. at *13.
101. In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 08-md-2002, 2016 WL 5539592,
at *13 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2016).
102. See, e.g., Our Farmers, DAIRY FARMERS OF AMERICA [https://perma.cc/7GRXD94H] (last visited March 11, 2021) (Dairy Farmers of America has over 13,000 members).
103. Id. The court had previously held that the cooperative, United Egg Producers
(“UEP”), was not entitled to Capper-Volstead immunity because it counted at least one nonproducer as a member. In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 08-md-2002, 2016
WL 4922706, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2016).
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difference.”104 Unfortunately, both courts confused “good faith”
with intent. It is true that the antitrust laws do not require specific
intent to restrain trade. But a “good faith” defense isn’t based on
the lack of intent to violate the antitrust laws, but rather in the
belief that the conduct is covered by the antitrust immunity
afforded by the Act. In other words, “specific intent” relates to
why the defendant engaged in the conduct, while “good faith”
simply relates to the reasonable belief that the conduct is
immunized by the Act.
Finally, the district court in In re Processed Egg Products
Antitrust Litigation emphasized that exemptions from the
antitrust laws are to be narrowly construed. While true, the
judiciary has accepted good faith defenses in a variety of other
contexts.105 The common thread in these decisions is the principle
that, when Congress has seen fit to create industry-specific
antitrust immunities, innocent participants that attempt to utilize
those immunities in good faith should not be held liable. That
same principle supports recognizing a good faith defense to
antitrust liability under the Capper-Volstead Act.
C. Are Cooperative Efforts to Manage Supply Protected by
Capper-Volstead?
As noted previously, the Act expressly permits the
“collective[] processing, preparing for market, handling, and
marketing” of agricultural products, and case law has extended
the Act’s protection to price-fixing.106 Recent cases against
farmer cooperatives have focused on activities that allegedly were
designed to reduce the supply of the product, and thereby raise its
prices, rather than a straightforward conspiracy to fix prices. The
allegations include:

104. In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 2016 WL 5539592 at *13.
105. See, e.g., Feather v. United Mine Workers of Am., 711 F.2d 530, 542-43 (3d Cir.
1983) (labor); In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1993)
(Interstate Commerce Act); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 691 F.2d 678 (4th Cir.
1982) (healthcare); MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983)
(telecommunications).
106. 7 U.S.C. § 291; Treasure Valley Potato Bargaining Ass’n v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc.,
497 F.2d 203, 214 (9th Cir. 1974).
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In re Mushroom Antitrust Litigation: Mushroom growers’
cooperative allegedly purchased out-of-production mushroom
farms and then imposed deed restrictions prohibiting future
mushroom production.107
In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litigation: Egg
producers’ cooperative allegedly agreed upon, and implemented,
an animal welfare program that included measures (including
increasing cage space provided to egg-laying hens) that were
designed to reduce the national number of hens, and hence the
number of eggs produced.108
Edwards v. National Milk Producers Federation: Dairy
cooperative allegedly paid producers to take cows out of
production.109
In re Fresh and Process Potatoes Antitrust Litigation: Potato
growers’ cooperative allegedly instituted a voluntary program to
reduce plantings.110
Though cooperatives can clearly choose when, at what price
and even whether to sell their inventory,111 plaintiffs have argued,
to some success, that the Capper-Volstead Act does not protect
efforts to reduce supply, especially when those efforts are
employed prior to production.112 In 2011, the district court in In
re Fresh and Process Potatoes Antitrust Litigation issued an
“advisory opinion” that Capper-Volstead does not protect preproduction (as opposed to post-harvest) supply control
activities.113
In an article on the subject, Christine Varney, then Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, outlined the
arguments on both sides of the “production restrictions” issue and
107. In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 514 F. Supp. 2d 683, 689 (E.D.
Pa. 2007).
108. In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig.,851 F. Supp. 2d 867, 877-78 (E.D. Pa.
2012).
109. Edwards v. Nat’l Milk Producers Fed’n, No. 11 Civ. 4766, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July
19, 2012).
110. In re Fresh & Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1148-49
(D. Idaho 2011).
111. In Alexander v. Nat’l Farmers Org., the court indicated that the cooperative was
permitted to withhold (destroy) products as a negotiation technique. 687 F.2d 1173, 1188
(8th Cir. 1982).
112. In re Fresh & Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d at 1154.
113. Id. at 1152, 1154.
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noted, “Courts have not provided definitive guidance on this
issue, and there are well-reasoned arguments supporting each
side.”114
Terms used in the Capper-Volstead Act such as “preparing
for market” can reasonably be interpreted to include planting
decisions and collective decisions on how much to produce.115
Indeed, the Fisherman’s Collective Marketing Act (“FCMA”),116
an exemption for fishermen modeled on the Capper-Volstead Act
and which uses language almost identical to the Capper-Volstead
Act, has been interpreted to protect fishermen who agreed not to
fish.117 In a Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) adjudication,
FTC Chairman Paul Rand Dixon opined that fishermen who
“s[at] on the beach” to create a shortage and force an increase in
prices were found to be exempt; “Thus, so long as the members
of a cooperative are acting pursuant to an agreement voluntarily
entered into . . . they are to be considered a single entity for
antitrust purposes, the same as an ordinary business corporation
with a number of ‘divisions.’”118
Logic and economic efficiency suggest that if destruction of
harvested crops is permitted, pre-production restrictions should
similarly be permitted119—prohibiting such conduct would be
counterintuitive.120 Telling farmers that they can manage supply
only after they invest their money and resources in planting a
crop, harvesting it, and then destroying it, makes little economic
sense and runs counter to the antitrust laws’ goals of promoting
efficiency. Moreover, legislative history indicates that one
purpose of the Capper-Volstead Act was to treat cooperatives like
single corporate entities,121 which, as Chairman Dixon noted in In
114. Christine Varney, The Capper-Volstead Act, Agricultural Cooperatives, and
Antitrust Immunity, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2010, at 5.
115. Id. at 7.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 521 .
117. In re Washington Crab Ass’n, 66 F.T.C. 45, 1964 WL 73029, at *45, *59 (July
10, 1964).
118. Id. at *59. Some commentators, though, have noted that the FCMA also includes
language authorizing cooperation in “catching” and “producing” fish. Varney, supra note
113, at 5.
119. Varney, supra note 113, at 7.
120. Id. at 7-8.
121. See, e.g., 62 CONG. REC. 2225 (1922) (statement of Sen. Lenroot); 62 CONG. REC.
2058 (1922) (statement of Sen. Capper).
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re Washington Crab Association, are permitted to decide how
much to produce.122
Those challenging Capper-Volstead immunity have
nevertheless maintained that supply restrictions should be treated
differently than price-fixing and are not exempt from the antitrust
laws.123 First, they argue that the Capper-Volstead Act does not
expressly provide for supply restrictions.124 That argument is not
persuasive because the same is true for price-fixing. Second,
some argue that supply and price-fixing are not simply two sides
of the same coin.125 Fixing prices at super-competitive levels may
encourage producers to increase production, which would tend to
decrease prices, whereas a pre-production agreement to affect
supply has no such built-in mechanism that limits the effects of
the alleged anticompetitive conduct.126 The flaw in this argument
is that, by the laws of supply and demand, price-fixing itself can
only be maintained when supply is reduced to meet the new,
fixed, market-clearing price.127 Thus, cooperatives that have
collectively set a price have already implicitly managed supply.
D. Does Vertical Integration Nullify the Exemption?
The Capper-Volstead Act applies to “[p]ersons engaged in
the production of agricultural products as farmers, planters,
ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers . . . .”128 Unfortunately,
the Act does not define these terms or otherwise give guidance as
to who qualifies as a “farmer.” This is important because many
modern-day farmers, like their cooperatives, engage in other
activities that further process the agricultural products they grow,
raise, or harvest.129 The question is whether such vertical
integration means these farmers no longer qualify for “farmer”
122. In re Washington Crab Ass’n, 66 F.T.C. 45, 1964 WL 73029 at *59 .
123. Varney, supra note 113, at 5.
124. See, e.g., In re Fresh & Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 1141,
1154-55 (D. Idaho 2011).
125. Id at 1156.
126. See, e.g., id. at 1156-1157.
127. Kleen Prods. LLC v. Int’l. Paper, 276 F. Supp. 3d 811, 827 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
128. 7 U.S.C. § 291.
129. See Cooperatives, NAT’L AGRIC. L. CTR., [https://perma.cc/G26B-T356] (last
visited Jan. 27, 2021).
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status under the Capper-Volstead Act.130 Despite precedent
supportive of vertical integration, the argument has been raised in
In re Mushrooms Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, In re
Fresh & Process Potatoes, and In re Processed Eggs Product
Litigation.
The Supreme Court in Sunkist Growers v. Winckler & Smith
Citrus Prod. Co., clarified that cooperatives may contain
members who are vertically integrated.131 Sunkist was an
agricultural cooperative comprised of citrus growers and other
agricultural cooperatives that handled the advertising, packing,
and distribution of the members’ fruit.132 One of the agricultural
cooperative organizations was owned and operated exclusively
by a number of lemon-grower associations, all of which were also
members of Sunkist.133 The Court held that multiple cooperatives
consisting of “the same growers and associations, cannot be
charged with conspiracy among themselves.”134 In applying
Capper-Volstead immunity to the entire cooperative organization,
the Court held irrelevant that the packing, advertising, sales, and
processing activities were completed through distinct
divisions.135 The Court stated, “To hold otherwise would be to
impose grave legal consequences upon organizational
distinctions that are of de minimis meaning and effect to these
growers who have banded together for processing and marketing
purposes within the purview of the Clayton and Capper-Volstead
Acts.”136
In Case-Swayne Co., Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, the Supreme
Court considered a different aspect of the vertical integration
question.137 There, Sunkist, the grower cooperative, included
members who were “packing houses” that were not actually
owned by the citrus grower members.138 The Court held that
130.
131.
(1962).
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See 7 U.S.C. § 291.
Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prod. Co., 370 U.S. 19, 21
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id. at 29.
Winckler & Smith Citrus Prod. Co., 370 U.S. at 29.
Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384, 386–87 (1967).
Id.
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“Congress did not intend to allow an organization with such
nonproducer interests to avail itself of the Capper-Volstead
exemption.”139 As a result, Sunkist was not entitled to assert the
exemption as a defense. Following this decision, Sunkist
reorganized its structure and both parties moved the district court
to determine whether the new structure brought Sunkist within the
Capper-Volstead exemption.140 The new structure did not allow
the independent packing houses to hold membership or voting
control in the cooperative, but vertically integrated producer
members—citrus growers that own packing houses—were still
valid members of the cooperative entity.141 Under this structure,
the district court held that the Sunkist cooperative was compliant
with Capper-Volstead Act requirements.142
Similarly, agency decisions have noted that cooperatives
with vertically integrated members qualify for the exemption.143
In a business review letter, the Antitrust Division stated it had no
intention of challenging a cooperative that included members that
not only produced vegetables but also processed them in their
own packing houses or in packing houses owned by other
members.144 The Federal Trade Commission has found that a
cooperative in which members were involved in the growing and
shipping of lettuce also met the requirements of the Act.145
The legislative history of the Act is also instructive.
Congress considered the issue of whether a vertically integrated
producer would still qualify as a producer under the proposed
legislation and appeared to conclude it would.146 For example,
139. Id. at 395–96.
140. Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 408, 409 (D. C.D. Cali.
1971).
141. Id. at 414–15.
142. Id. at 415.
143. Business Review Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice issued to Texas Produce
Marketing Cooperative (Mar. 17, 1988).
144. Id.
145. See In re Cent. Cal. Lettuce Producers Coop., 90 F.T.C. 18, 1977 WL 288550 at
*15-16 (Administrative Law Judge determining that the organization met the structural and
organization requirements of Section 6 of the Clayton Act and the Capper-Volstead Act but
ruling against the cooperative on price-fixing); In re Cent. Cal. Lettuce Producers Coop. 1977
WL 288550 at *33 (Commissioners setting aside decision on price-fixing and dismissing
complaint). See also N. Cal. Supermarkets, Inc. v. Cent. Cal. Lettuce Producers Coop., 413
F. Supp. 984, 985-986 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
146. 62 CONG. REC. 2121 (1922) (statement of Sen. Pomerene).
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Senators Walsh and Pomerene recognized that vertically
integrated producers/processors could join with other farmers.147
In later remarks, Senator Walsh recognized that, under both
proposed bills, the association:
[M]ust be an organization of the producers themselves of the
product of the farm. [The producers] may engage in
marketing that product or they may engage in processing it
for the purpose of putting it upon the market, but the
proposed legislation would exclude a combination of
producers of condensed milk who do not themselves produce
it.148

Furthermore, one stated purpose of the proposed legislation
was to bring farmers and consumers closer together.149 Vertical
integration would, in theory, eliminate at least one of the
middlemen and improve producer returns.
Attacks on vertical integration persist, however, based
primarily on remarks by Justice Brennan in his concurring
opinion in National Broiler Marketing Association.150 There,
Justice Brennan opined that too much vertical integration could
convert a farmer into a “processor” or “distributor” and imperil
the exemption.151 In delineating whether someone is rightfully
considered a “farmer” and therefore enjoys antitrust immunity or
whether she is a “processor” and lacks statutory protection,
Justice Brennan stated the following:
The statute itself may provide the functional definition of
farmer as persons engaged in agriculture who are
insufficiently integrated to perform their own processing and
who therefore can benefit from the exemption for
147. Id.
148. Id. at 2156 (statement of Sen. Walsh).
149. 59 CONG. REC. 7852 (1920) (statement of Rep. Morgan) (“We may safely
encourage any system that will bring the producers and consumer in closer contact; that will
provide a more efficient and more economical system of marketing, manufacturing,
transporting, and distributing the products of the farm. The so-called middlemen cannot, of
course, all be eliminated, but all unnecessary middlemen should be eliminated. The so-called
middlemen should not be in a position to demand excessive profits. Our system of marketing
should be such as will give to the farmers the greatest possible proportion of the wealth they
produce.”)
150. See Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n, v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 832–36, 839 (1978)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
151. Id.
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cooperative handling, processing, and marketing. Thus, in
my view, the nature of the association’s activities, the degree
of integration of its members, and the functions historically
performed by farmers in the industry are relevant
considerations in deciding whether an association is
exempt.152

Two district courts have subsequently cited the Brennan
test.153 In United States v. Hinote, the district court found that
two of the alleged conspirators (one of which was a subsidiary of
ConAgra) were primarily processors and thus, denied the
exemption.154 In the more recent decision, In re Fresh and
Process Potatoes Antitrust Litigation, the district court held that
a better-developed record was necessary.155 No appellate court
has had an occasion to opine on, or apply, Justice Brennan’s
test.156
E. Who is a Farmer?
As discussed, only farmers qualify for the Capper-Volstead
Act’s exemption, but the Act provides little guidance on who may
qualify as a farmer. In In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust
Litigation, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, claiming
that certain cooperative members were simply distributors, rather
than farmers.157 These entities did not own the land on which the
hens were raised, nor did they own the hens themselves.158
Instead, they had a contractual relationship with companies that
owned the egg-laying hens whereby they raised and cared for the
hens and purchased the eggs and then packaged and resold the
eggs.159 Defendants argued that because the member actively
152. Id. at 836.
153. United States v. Hinote, 823 F. Supp. 1350, 1355 (S.D. Miss. 1993); In re Fresh
& Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1153 (D. Idaho 2011).
154. Hinote, 823 F. Supp. at 1359.
155. In re Fresh & Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d at 1154.
156. In its Statement of Interest in the Sitts case, the Antitrust Division suggested that
if the challenged conduct was being pursued by the defendant in its capacity as a “handler or
processor,” then immunity should not be available. Statement of Int. on Behalf of the U.S.
supra note 51, at 8.
157. In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 08-md-2002, 2016 WL 4922706,
at *1, *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2016).
158. Id. at *2.
159. Id.
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managed the egg production at the farms from which they
purchased the eggs and were deeply involved in the husbandry of
the hens, they qualified as a “farmer.”160
In holding that the member did not qualify for farmer status,
the court in In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litigation161
court cited National Broiler Marketing Association,162 saying the
“Court held that members of a cooperative which neither owned
breeder flocks nor hatcheries and maintained no grow-out
facilities where flocks to which they had titled were raised, could
not be considered ‘farmers’ for purposes of the Act.”163 The court
went on to hold that because the member did not own any of the
farms where its eggs were produced, “this arrangement is
indistinguishable from a preplanting contract, which the Court in
National Broiler held was not the kind of investment Congress
intended to protect under Capper-Volstead.”164
Ownership of the farmland is certainly a factor in
determining “farmer” status. It makes little sense, though, to
allow ownership of land to be the sole criteria in this
determination, which would exclude leasehold farmers and
sharecroppers, while ignoring traditional farming activities such
as husbandry of livestock.
IV. BARGAINING POWER–THEN AND NOW
The question can fairly be asked: Has the Capper-Volstead
Act outlived its usefulness? After all, many agricultural
cooperatives are big businesses nowadays.165 Indeed, plaintiffs
in the cases challenging the application of the Capper-Volstead
Act make this argument, both implicitly and explicitly.166
The fact remains that agriculture is different from other
industries. Production of agricultural products has a far longer
160. Id. at *13.
161. See In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 2016 WL 4922706, at *5.
162. See Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 827-28 (1978).
163. In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 2016 WL 4922706, at *5.
164. Id. at *5.
165. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ERS, FARMING AND FARM INCOME,
[https://perma.cc/USU6-X8YS] (last visited Nov. 2, 2018).
166. Transcript of Oral Argument at 268, In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig.,
No. 08-md-2002 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
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lead time than its manufactured counterparts, due to the need for
planting and harvesting, in the case of crops, or birthing and
rearing animals, in the case of livestock.167 Additionally, Mother
Nature, always a fickle variable, plays a huge role in the success
or failure of any year’s yield. And, of course, these products are
generally perishable. Given that these products form the very
basis of the foodstuffs we consume daily, agriculture has always
enjoyed special legislative protection.
Nevertheless, it was the imbalance in bargaining power
between the buyers of the agricultural products and the individual
farmers who produced them that spurred the passage of the
Capper-Volstead Act. And, though agricultural producers have
grown in size, so have their customers, resulting in the same
relative imbalance today.
In the early 1920s, when the Capper-Volstead Act was under
consideration, there were approximately 6,448,000 farms in the
United States.168 These were small farms that often found
themselves at the mercy of middlemen and buyers due to a lack
of bargaining power and the perishable nature of their products.169
As farm prices became depressed, farmers were abandoning their
farms to move to cities. Consumers and legislators were
concerned about potential food shortages. The power of the
buyers over the individual farmers impelled the passage of the
Act.170
The modern era has been marked by the consolidation of
buyers and farm units alike. As the Department of Justice was
conducting a series of workshops into antitrust issues affecting
agriculture, food retail, and processing companies continued
along a path of rapid consolidation.171 By 2009, the top food
167. Cf. Brian Scott, Planting is over. Now what do farmers do?, THE FARMER’S LIFE
(June 6, 2015, 12:57 PM), [https://perma.cc/FQ9Z-TBK8].
168. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FOURTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES
TAKEN IN THE YEAR 1920, AGRICULTURE vol. 5, 24.
169. In the Sixty-seventh Congress, Senator Lenroot stated, “[W]e are justified in
enacting this legislation which will enable the farmers of this country to put themselves
somewhat nearer an equality of bargaining power and control of output in production that
other industries have to-day.” 180. 62 CONG. REC. 2225 (1922) (statement of Sen. Lenroot).
170. Alison Peck, The Cost of Cutting Agricultural Output: Interpreting the CapperVolstead Act, 80 MO. L. REV. 451, 497 (2015).
171. Consolidation and Buyer Power in the Grocery Industry, FOOD & WATER
WATCH (Dec. 2010), [https://perma.cc/G7PP-M6JY].
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retailers—Wal-Mart, Kroger, Costco, and Supervalu—controlled
more than half of all grocery sales in the United States.172
Consolidation has thus given top retailers considerable
purchasing power as wholesale buyers of groceries, and many
food-processing firms justify their mergers as an effort to create
stronger bargaining power with these large retailers.173 The
number of farmers has declined by over two-thirds, from nearly
6.5 million in the 1920s, to 2.06 million in 2016.174 At the same
time, cooperatives have consolidated into larger units and their
customers have become national and international enterprises.175
In 2010, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) and
Department of Justice held a series of workshops (“Workshops”)
around the country entitled “Exploring Competition Issues in
Agriculture.”176 At the June 25, 2010 Workshop in Madison,
Wisconsin, Robert Cropp, Professor Emeritus of Agriculture and
Applied Science at the University of Wisconsin, presented data
indicating that the bargaining power imbalance that the CapperVolstead Act was designed to correct is just as prevalent today, if
not more so.177 For example, in 2010, Wal-Mart topped the
Fortune 500 list with food revenues of approximately $230
billion.178 By contrast, total revenue of all dairy cooperatives in
the country was less than $40 billion, with the largest dairy
cooperative having sales of $10 billion.179 In 2010, the largest
agricultural cooperative, CHS, Inc., had revenues of $26
billion.180 A number of their customers are on the Fortune 500
list, including Kroger, SuperValu, and Kraft. Each of these

172. Id.
173. Id.
174. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., FARMS AND LAND IN FARMS
2016 SUMMARY (Feb. 2017) at 4.
175. Andrew Grant, Five trends and their implications for agricultural coops,
MCKINSEY (2012), [https://perma.cc/2M89-3SQ3].
176. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department and USDA to Hold
Public Workshops to Explore Competition Issues in the Agriculture Industry (Aug. 5, 2009),
[ https://perma.cc/JD7A-E8ZG].
177. Transcript of Record at 191:9-198:5, U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
Dairy Workshop: A Dialogue on Competition Issues Facing Farmers in Today’s Agricultural
Marketplace (June 25, 2010), [https://perma.cc/H4ST-78M5].
178. Id. at 193:3-6.
179. Id. at 193:12-19.
180. Id. at 193:7-11.
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entities have revenues that are large multiples of those of the
largest cooperatives.181
Furthermore, there has been a great deal of consolidation in
the retail grocery industry. Progressive Grocer’s Super 50 list of
the largest grocery chains does not include membership clubs
such as Sam’s, Costco, and BJ’s.182 Yet, as reported in May 2018,
the combined annual sales of the Super 50 grocers still tops $580
billion.183 The top ten, which includes Wal-Mart, Kroger, and
Safeway, accounts for more than seventy-seven percent of those
sales, or approximately $450 billion.184 Similarly, Associated
Wholesale Grocers, a buying group not even included in the
Super 50, had revenues of approximately $9.2 billion in 2016.185
In comparison, according to a study by the USDA, combined
revenues of all United States agricultural cooperatives topped
$212 billion and the one hundred largest agricultural cooperatives
in the United States reported combined revenues of $146 billion
in 2015—a fraction of the combined revenue of just the top ten
retail grocers.186 Just as they were ninety-nine years ago, today’s
farmers are still confronted with the disproportionate bargaining
power of their huge customers. 187 Consequently, the very
conditions that compelled passage of the Capper-Volstead Act
back in 1922 prevail today.

181. Id. at 193:15-17.
182. Jim Dudlicek, Top 50 Grocers: Amazon in 8th Place While Rest of Industry
Restrategizes, Reshuffles, PROGRESSIVE GROCER, [https://perma.cc/8LFD-2VBW].
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. ASSOCIATED WHOLESALE GROCERS, INC., 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2017), [
https://perma.cc/LZN9-65GH].
186. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRIC., RURAL DEV., AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE
STATISTICS 2015 6-7 (2017), [https://perma.cc/5DYM-MMVR].
187. Just recently, the Center for Science in the Public Interest, a consumer advocacy
group, requested that the Federal Trade Commission investigate the grocery retail industry
with respect to a number of practices. As one example of the retailers’ power, the group
claims that the practice of charging trade promotion fees prevents farmers from being able
to locate their products in prime store locations. Hon. Rebecca Slaughter, et. al., Request to
Investigate Trade Promotion, Category Captain, and Online Retail Practices in the Grocery
Retail Industry, CENTER FOR SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST (Feb. 19, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/6GYV-YE93]
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V. IMPACT ON FOREIGN LAW
The United States is not the only country to have adopted an
agricultural policy designed to afford certain protection to
farmers; under the European Union’s common agricultural
policy, certain behavior and practices by agricultural producer
organizations, which might otherwise be considered as
anticompetitive, are excluded from the scope of the European
Union’s competition rules.188 It is not surprising, therefore, that
current attempts to undermine and weaken the American farmers’
antitrust exemption could easily have international implications.
Numerous foreign countries already use the United States’
antitrust law as a model, and several have adopted antitrust
exemptions for agricultural cooperatives similar to the CapperVolstead Act.189 Farmers in developing economies have faced or
will eventually face the same challenges as those that confronted
American farmers at the time the Capper-Volstead Act was
passed.190 They deserve the same protection. Their governments
could easily adopt restrictive rulings from United States courts,191
188. See, e.g., Luis A. Gomez and Rachel Cuff, ECJ Clarifies Agriculture Exclusion
of EU Competition Rules: Endive Producers Must Turn Over a New Leaf, LEXOLOGY (Nov.
29, 2017), [https://perma.cc/TD5P-MRQY].
189. For example, Japan’s Anti-Monopoly Law of 1947, following the example of the
Capper-Volstead Act, exempts certain agricultural cooperatives from its application. See
Hiroshi Ashino, Experimenting with Anti-Trust Law in Japan, 3 JAPANESE ANN. INT’L L.
31, 31 (1959); Hiroshi Iyori, A Comparison of U.S.-Japan Antitrust Law: Looking at the
International Harmonization of Competition Law, 4 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 59, 66 (1995).
Agricultural cooperatives in Europe are similarly exempted from liability under Article 81
of the European Community (“EC”) Treaty—Europe’s analog to the Sherman Act—by
Regulation 26, adopted by the EC Council in 1962. Arie Reich, The Agricultural Exemption
in Antitrust Law: A Comparative Look at the Political Economy of Market Regulation, 42
TEX. INT’L L.J. 843, 849-50 (2007). The United Kingdom’s Competition Act of 1998
contains an exemption for agricultural cooperatives patterned on the EC’s Regulation 26. Id.
at 856. And Israel, which regulates competition under its Restrictive Trade Practices Law of
1988, provides an exemption to agricultural cooperatives under Article 3(4) of that Law. Id.
at 857-58.
190. SERGE ADJOGNON & ANWARD NASSEM, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, CONTRACT FARMING AS A TOOL FOR POVERTY
REDUCTION IN AFRICA 2-3, [https://perma.cc/275L-XSYY]
191. Indeed, foreign courts often find U.S. case law instructive in interpreting their
own antitrust laws. See, e.g., Rural Press Ltd. v Australian Competition and Consumer
Comm’n, (2003) 216 CLR 53, 88 (Austl.) (holding market-sharing arrangements per se
invalid under the Australian Trade Practices Act, citing favorably to United States case-law
holding such arrangements to be per se violations of the Sherman Act); R. v. Bugden’s Taxi
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which could keep their farmers from achieving effective
collective bargaining power.
International efforts have been underway to aid the
development of farmer cooperatives and the laws that protect
their activities. In a May 2012 report, the European Competition
Network (“ECN”) noted concerns about price volatility and
competitiveness in food production and distribution.192 Some
national competition authorities believe that cooperation among
producers and the creation of cooperatives would increase
competition in the food sector.193 By 2013 these concerns led to
the European Union’s adoption of significant reforms to its
Common Agricultural Policy (the “CAP”) that set new rules for
allowing joint-selling by producers in the agricultural sector.194
In November 2015, the European Commission adopted
guidelines on potential competition issues arising in the
implementation of these new rules as they pertain to the olive oil,
beef and veal, and arable crops sectors.195 CAP reform removed
production restraints to encourage farmers to base their
production decisions on market signals.196 The legal framework
(1970) Ltd., 2007NLTD167 at para. 24 (N.L. Sup. Ct.–Trial Div.) (describing Canada’s
Competition Act as creating a “partial rule of reason” by way of analogy to United States
case law interpreting the Sherman Act); Cases C-468/06 to C-478/06, Sot Lelos kai Sia EE
v. GlaxoSmithKline AEVE Farmakeftikon Proionton, 2008 E.C.R. I-07139, ¶ 65; Commerce
Comm’n v. Caltex New Zealand Ltd., [1998] 2 NZLR 78 at [83-84] (looking to United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) to determine what constitutes price
fixing); Am. Natural Soda Ash Corp. v. Competition Comm’n of South Africa, 2005 (9)
BCLR 862 (SCA) at para. 50 (looking to Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. 441 U.S. 1 (1978) to determine what constitutes price fixing); Institute of
Independent Ins. Brokers v. Director General of Fair Trading, [2001] CAT 4, 1003/2/1/01, ¶
174 (U.K. Competition Comm’n Appeal Trib. Sept. 17, 2001) (citing cases implying a rule
of reason borrowed from United States. case-law in the interpretation of Article 81(1) of the
EC Treaty).
192. See EUROPEAN COMPETITION NETWORK, ECN ACTIVITIES IN THE FOOD
SECTOR: REPORT ON COMPETITION LAW ENF’T AND MARKET MONITORING ACTIVITIES BY
EUROPEAN COMPETITION AUTHS IN THE FOOD SECTOR 18 (2012), [https://perma.cc/P4WDQAK7]
193. Id. at 10.
194. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, AGRICULTURAL POLICY PERSPECTIVES BRIEF NO. 5.
OVERVIEW OF CAP REFORM 2014-2020 (2013), [hereinafter CAP] [https://perma.cc/445QK5TR]
195. See Guidelines on the application of the specific rules set out in Articles 169, 170
and 171 of the CMO Regulation for the olive oil, beef and veal and arable crops sectors,
2015 O.J. (C 431) 4, [https://perma.cc/FR24-S5N6].
196. CAP supra note 194, at 5.
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under CAP reform also “extend[ed] the possibility for collective
bargaining (in some [agricultural] sectors) and delivery contracts
(for all [agricultural] sectors) to [p]roducer [o]rganisations, their
[a]ssociations and Inter Branch Organisations.”197
The U.S. Overseas Cooperative Development Council
(funded by USAID) is conducting a major initiative called the
“Cooperative Law and Regulation Initiative” (“CLARITY”).198
Part of that initiative involves providing assistance to help
national cooperative movements organize themselves, and
helping to evaluate and improve their cooperative laws.199
CLARITY points to the Capper-Volstead Act as an exemplar for
implementing exemptions from competition law that would
otherwise prohibit certain joint action between businesses for
cooperatives.200
VI. CONCLUSION
The more things change, the more they stay the same. As
true now as it was in the 1920s, the number of farms continues to
decline. Farmers and their cooperatives are still at the mercy of
power buyers, Mother Nature, and the international marketplace.
There is still a large imbalance of bargaining power. In short, the
same conditions and concerns that existed at the time the CapperVolstead Act was passed continue to this day.
As the Supreme Court stated in Maryland and Virginia Milk
Producers Association v. United States:
We believe it is reasonably clear from the very language of
the Capper-Volstead Act, as it was in § 6 of the Clayton Act,
that the general philosophy of both was simply that
individual farmers should be given, through agricultural
cooperatives acting as entities, the same unified competitive

197. Id. at 5 n.7.
198. See
THE
COOPERATIVE
LAW
AND
REGULATION
INITIATIVE,
[https://perma.cc/LX7W-EN9B] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021).
199. Id.
200. U.S. AGENCY INT’L DEV., ENABLING COOPERATIVE DEV., PRINCIPLES FOR
LEGAL REFORM 17 (2006), [https://perma.cc/RAK7-2UXC] (last visited Mar. 4, 2018).
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advantage–and responsibility–available to businessmen
acting through corporations as entities.201

That rationale continues to apply today. Nevertheless,
power buyers and other opportunistic interests continue to enlist
the courts in eroding the basic foundations of the exemption, and
the implications will have far reaching effects. The bargaining
power and economic viability of farmers and their cooperatives
will be undermined here and abroad as foreign governments and
their courts follow the lead of the United States. Aggressive legal
attacks on the very foundations of cooperatives themselves are
being waged and hope now rests with the higher courts or
Congress.

201. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass’n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 466
(1960).

